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The Ex-com mu nist’s Pol icy of For get ting 
in Ro ma nia af ter 1990
ALEXANDRU GUSSI
Af ter any radi cal po liti cal change, there in evi ta bly oc curs some form of ”rec ol-
lec tion of memo ries”1, a proc ess through which the past is re evalu ated in the light 
of the val ues privi leged by the new po liti cal re gime. The fall of com mu nism, for 
all coun tries in volved, pre sup posed a rup ture at both the dis cur sive and the sym-
bolic level. An en tire sys tem of le giti macy and its views on his tory be came un us-
able. As Kathe rine Verd ery has ob served:
”In East ern Europe, re writ ing his tory has been per haps un usu ally nec es-
sary be cause of pow er ful pres sures to cre ate po liti cal iden ti ties based ex pressly 
on re ject ing the im me di ate past. The pres sures came not just from popu lar re-
vul sion with com mu nism, but also from de sires to per suade West ern au di-
ences to con trib ute the aid and in vest ment es sen tial to re con struc tion”2.
The new po liti cal par ties play an im por tant part in the con flicts that de vel-
oped fol low ing that shift in col lec tive mem ory. The logic of mem ory en tails that 
one should start in the pre sent to look at the past, which is re garded as the cause 
of this pre sent. As prior to 1989 com mu nism was re garded as ir re versi ble, an un-
sur pass able ho ri zon, its fall forci bly brought a dif fer ent in ter pre ta tion of its sig nifi-
cance. This newly emerged proc ess could not de velop in de pend ently of an tago nist 
po liti cal in ter ests as so ci ated to the re defi ni tion of the coun try’s na tional iden tity. 
Geof frey Prid ham has pre vi ously pointed out that ”na tional iden tity ex presses a 
ba sic form of col lec tive ex peri ence, while par ties are im por tant as agents for trans-
mis sion, but also trans mog ri fi ca tion of his tori cal memo ries”3.
If col lec tive mem ory is ”not a mem ory, but a dis course that takes place in the 
pub lic arena”4, that dis course builds the im age that a so ci ety (or a group within) 
wants to cre ate for it self. The as pect that needs to be brought into fo cus is not the 
de bate on com pet ing im ages of the past per se, but the in flu ence of such im ages on 
the po liti cal forces (as a fac tor of iden ti fi ca tion, of con ver gence, and of di ver gence) 
through the en tire tran si tion pe riod un der gone by Ro ma nia5.
1 Paul CONNERTON, How Societies Remember, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1989, p. 6.
2 Katherine VERDERY, The Political Lives of Dead Bodies. Reburial and Postsocialist Change, 
Columbia University Press, New York, 1999, p. 52.
3 Geoffrey PRDHAM, The Dynamics of Democratization. A Comparative Approach, Continuum, 
London and NewYork, 2000, p. 35.
4 Tsvetan TODOROV, Mémoire du mal, tentation du bien. Enquête sur le siècle, Robert Laffont, 
Paris, 2000, p. 144.
5 On the subject of collective memory, I am referring to the following works: Maurice 
HALBWACS, La topographie légendaire des Évangiles en terre sainte, PUF, Paris, 1941, p. 118; 
IDEM, La mémoire collective, Albin Michel, Paris, 1997, first edition published in 1950; Pierre 
NORA in IDEM (ed.), Les lieux de mémoire vol. 1-2. La République. La Nation. Les France, Gallimard, 
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The ab sence of a multi-party sys tem – to gether with that of any form of al ter-
na tive dis course1 – prior to the fall of the com mu nist re gime caused the dawn of 
Ro ma nian post-com mu nism to take the shape of a quest for an al ter na tive le giti-
macy as well as that of a rush to re in vent the foun da tions of a plu ral istic po liti cal 
dis course. Vladi mir Tis măne anu ar gues that:
”Left, right, cen ter: all these no tions have strange and elu sive mean ings 
un der post-com mu nism. Us ing in ter pre ta tive West ern para digms would 
sim ply cre ate false analo gies and would ex plain lit tle, if any thing”2.
In fact, there are at least two main ex pla na tions why post-com mu nist po liti cal 
cul ture re serves doc trines a mi nor role. First, the to tali tar ian pe riod un der mined 
the im por tance of con vic tions. At that time, it would have been ab surd to seek any 
co her ence be tween what one thought and how one acted, or be tween how one 
acted and what one said. The sec ond ex pla na tion is that all main po liti cal ac tors 
share, to dif fer ent de grees, the same views on the pro gress of de moc ra ti za tion: the 
ne ces sity for a mar ket econ omy and the rule of law. Con se quently, the di rec tion of 
the tran si tion is not in ques tion, but its pace and its means are. In other words, the 
con flict has taken place over what is to be done with the com mu nist leg acy.
Origi nally, the right and the left were two di ver gent vi sions on the past3. The 
cir cum stances of the main po liti cal rift of 1990-1992, there fore, are the key to un der-
stand ing post-com mu nist Ro ma nian poli tics, as it is based on them that tra di tions 
have been founded. As a re sult of the po liti cal con fron ta tion, two dis tinct memo-
ries emerge. The ini tial dis tinc tions are de fined and be come a cen tral is sue of the po-
liti cal de bate.
The po liti cal utili za tion of the past is cen tral in the proc ess of re fash ion ing po-
liti cal cul ture and adopt ing de moc ratic val ues, a proc ess which has proven prob-
lem atic for the Ro ma nian po liti cal elite.
The dan gers of a de com mu ni za tion through forms of col lec tive jus tice have of-
ten been em pha sized. At the same time, ”the pres ence of re gime al ter na tives to de-
moc racy de pends very much on per cep tions of the au thori tar ian past. His tori cally 
based anti-au thori tar ian at ti tudes con tin ued to dele giti mate a pos si ble re turn to 
non-de moc ratic rule”4. Ro ma nia pro vides us with a case of de com mu ni za tion in 
which the so ci ety has played a cen tral role, by means of its 1989 up ris ing and its re-
mark able evo lu tion that fol lowed and which has taken place mainly in spite of the 
pol icy of the State, while the State, at a dis cur sive level, has used this proc ess to ap-
pro pri ate a pos te ri ori this pro gress that has not been the re sult of its ac tions.
Paris, 1997, pp. 16 and 188-189; Paul RICOEUR, La mémoire, l’histoire, l’oubli, Seuil, Paris, 2000; Jean 
CANDEAU, Mémoire et identité, PUF, Paris, 1998; and Tsvetan TODOROV, Les abus de la Mémoire, 
Arléa, Paris, 1995.
1 For the Stalinist character of the communist Romanian regime, see Vladimir 
TISMĂNEANU, Stalinism for All Seasons. A Political History of Romanian Communism, University 
of California Press, Berkley, Los Angeles and London, 2003.
2 IDEM, ”The Leninist Debris or Waiting for Peron”, East European Politics and Societies, vol. 10, 
no. 3, Fall 1996, pp. 504-535/p. 504.
3 François FURET ”L’Ancien régime et la Révolution” and Marcel GAUCHET, ”La droite et la 
gauche”, in Pierre NORA (ed.), Les lieux de mémoire. Les France vol. 1.Conflicts et partages, Gallimard, 
Paris, 1992, pp. 106-139 and 394-467.
4 Geoffrey PRIDHAM, The Dynamics of Democratization. A Comparative Approach, Continuum, 
London and New-York, 2000, p. 226.
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The pre sent text ar gues that po liti cal plu ral ism in Ro ma nia took shape when 
the in ten sity of this bat tle for the past was at its peak. For that rea son, the iden tity 
of Ro ma nian po liti cal par ties re veals it self mainly in those par ties’ at ti tude to-
wards the com mu nist past. The first part of this text il lus trates the con di tions and 
the con text in which this rift oc curred. The sec ond part re fers to the man ner in 
which the newly emerged post-com mu nist power has rep re sented and re ferred to 
the com mu nist past, while the last part ana lyzes the role and the iden tity of the po-
liti cal party that played the main role in the Ro ma nian tran si tion, namely to day’s 
PSD, the Party of So cial De moc racy.
Ob ser va tions on the Con text
One can not pos si bly ig nore cer tain char ac ter is tics of the for mer com mu nist 
pe riod. Unlike other po liti cal tra di tions that ap peal to the col lec tive mem ory of a 
group, the of fi cial mem ory of the com mu nist re gime had no con nec tion to any col-
lec tive or in di vid ual form of mem ory, as it found jus ti fi ca tion in an al leg edly sci en-
tific read ing of his tory. Thus, the very con cept of ”mem ory” was a use less and 
even dan ger ous one, as the en tire his tory of dis si dent move ments dem on strates.
In fact, in Ro ma nia, trans par ency has never been of fi cial pol icy, nor have there 
been any ef forts to re turn to the pub lic space what was pre vi ously hid den in pri vate 
space, and hence to ex tend ac knowl edg ment of com mu nist crimes from the level of 
un der ground com mu ni ca tion to the of fi cial level. Thus, the en tire en deavor of sal vag-
ing the mem ory of the com mu nist crimes has been sub ject to poli ti ci za tion, ei ther 
through con fis ca tion or through de nun cia tion. Fur ther on, it will pub licly ap pear 
only in the con text of po liti cal dis courses of le giti macy for cer tain po liti cal par ties.
Given the fact that the char ac ter is tic con flict of the com mu nist pe riod was be-
tween mem ory and for get ting, and that im me di ately af ter 1989 the same type of 
con flict lay at the cen ter of the pub lic de bate, I shall fur ther ar gue that Ro ma nian 
po liti cal par ties will take a stand on ei ther side of a di vide that does not op pose dif-
fer ent im ages of the fallen re gime, but sets of im ages that cor re spond to those built 
be fore 1989. In other words, the is sue is not a ”bat tle of memo ries”. Rather, we are 
wit ness ing a con fron ta tion be tween po liti cal dis courses that ap proach the mem ory 
of the com mu nist re gime dif fer ently, one try ing to build a par ti san mem ory, the 
other – typi cal to the FSN (The Na tional Sal va tion Front) and to its suc ces sor, the 
PSD, as I shall try to de scribe later – em brac ing a very flexi ble vi sion of the past.
The most im por tant dif fer ence be tween Ro ma nia and the Cen tral Euro pean 
coun tries is, most proba bly, the use of vio lence, not only dur ing the events at the 
end of 1989, but also in their im me di ate af ter math. The fall of com mu nism gen er ally 
sur prised through its non-vio lence – a fact cred ited to the com mu nist rul ers of the 
mo ment, which goes a long way to ex plain their sub se quent re turn to power via the 
mecha nism of free elec tions. How ever, the pres ence of vio lence in Ro ma nia dur ing 
the days that brought forth the fall of com mu nism raises the ques tion of its com mu-
nist past on other grounds. The vio lence dur ing the proc ess of lib era tion from the to-
tali tar ian re gime, partly a con se quence of the fear of a vio lent de com mu ni za tion, 
ex plains why the is sue of the re la tion ship with the re cent past has served for so long 
as the main rift in Ro ma nian poli tics dur ing the first dec ade of its tran si tion.
The power in stated im me di ately af ter De cem ber 22, 1989 was the ex pres sion 
of a type of con ver sion un der gone by the for mer com mu nist elite, which adopted 
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the ”pro-de moc ratic revo lu tion ary” im age im posed by the fall of the com mu nist 
re gime, and which was later to bring ar gu ments for a pol icy of for get ting. It is this 
pol icy that was – at least for seven years, be tween 1990 and 1997 – the main ar gu-
ment for con test ing Ion Ili escu’s team (one re garded as a con tinu ator of the for mer 
”unique” com mu nist party), de spite its con sid er able popu lar sup port.
For the en tire first dec ade of de moc ra ti za tion, it was the po liti cal us age of the 
re cent past that de fined the main par ties: on the one hand there were the his tori cal 
par ties and their 1991 al li ance – the CDR (the Ro ma nian De moc ratic Con ven tion) – 
which were anti-com mu nist and sup port ing radi cal change, and, on the other hand, 
there were the par ties that were against all types of radi cal re form and were fun da-
men tally op posed to the logic of de com mu ni sa tion, such as the PDSR (the Ro ma nian 
So cial De moc rat Party), later con verted into the PSD (the Party of So cial De moc racy), 
along with the PRM (or the GRM, ”Great Ro ma nia” Party). This po liti cal po lari za tion 
played its part in the shap ing of dis tinct col lec tive memo ries by spe cific emerg ing 
groups that aimed to im pose ”their truth” as the of fi cial mem ory of the en tire popu la-
tion, thus gain ing – in ret ro spect – a privi leged role in the proc ess of re de fin ing na-
tional iden tity. This re defi ni tion, as well as the re con sid era tion of the past, is – and 
will cer tainly con tinue to be – one of the main co or di nates of poli tics in Ro ma nia.
While it is not only in re la tion to the re cent past that Ro ma nian po liti cal par-
ties have taken stand, it is cer tain at least that they de fine them selves and shape 
their iden tity with re spect to it. The anti-com mu nists stand firmly in op po si tion to 
the re cent his tory, whereas their op po nents have a par ticu lar type of dis course 
that re de fines to tali tar ian prac tices with the in ten tion of jus ti fy ing the part they 
per son ally played dur ing the com mu nist re gime and as sist ing the quiet con ver-
sion of the no menk la tura from the status of a forci bly in vested elite to that of a fi nan-
cial and po liti cal elite le giti mated through de moc ratic and capi tal ist mecha nisms.
An other trait of the Ro ma nian po liti cal life is the im por tant role played by per-
son ali ties, a fact aug mented by the in suf fi cient in sti tu tional and doc trinal strength of 
the po liti cal par ties. Con se quently, the re la tion to the past is of ten viewed in the light 
of the per sonal life ex peri ences of the po liti cal ac tors, who can range from ex-no menk-
la tura sec ond rank mem bers to po liti cal con victs with long prison terms be hind.
The Na tional Sal va tion Front, 
be tween Suc ces sion and Rup ture
I fo cus in stead on how the new Ro ma nian lead ers de fined them selves in re la-
tion to the fallen re gime. The Na tional Sal va tion Front, the FSN, es tab lished in the 
early days of the ”Ro ma nian Revo lu tion”, did not form an in sti tu -tional con tin-
uum with the for mer Ro ma nian Com mu nist Party, the PCR, but was to act sub se-
quently as a con ser va tive force. The first ret ro spec tive im age of the com mu nist 
past oc cured on De cem ber 22, 1989, in the first of fi cial state ment of the FSN, which 
de clared, in the am bigu ous terms of the rigid com mu nist id iom, that ”a new page is 
turn ing in the po liti cal and eco nomic life of Ro ma nia”1, yet also speci fied that ”all 
min is tries and cen tral or gans of the state are to con tinue their nor mal ac tiv ity”2.
1 Monitorul Oficial, vol. I, no. 1, December 22, 1989, p. 3. Translation from Romanian by the 
author, IDEM for the following footnotes.
2 Ibidem.
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The Ro ma nian Com mu nist Party and its ide ol ogy were not spe cifi cally men-
tioned and the text does not rep re sent the emerg ing po liti cal fu ture as be ing op-
posed to the past 45 years of com mu nist rule, but rather to the ”struc ture of power 
of the Ceauşescu clan”. The Com mu nist Party is in visi ble to the au thors of the dec-
la ra tion stat ing that ”the en tire power of the State is in the hands of the Na tional 
Sal va tion Front”. The FSN did not men tion a trans fer of at tri bu tions from the PCR, 
but only from the struc tures of power of the ”Ceauşescu clan”, as if it had been not 
the Com mu nist Party, but the ”Ceauşescu clan” that pre vi ously held power. Thus, 
the FSN came into power with a dis course that largely ig nored the very ex is tence 
of the for mer unique party. In the same state ment, the ”Ceauşescu clan” is held 
solely re spon si ble for the com mu nist crimes.
On De cem ber 25, 1989, in the state ment re gard ing the on com ing trial of the 
Ceauşescu cou ple, the Coun cil of the FSN (CFSN)1 ap pears to have al ready 
reached a de ci sion: ”The cul pa bil ity of the dic ta tor and his aco lytes be fore his tory 
and the laws will be es tab lished in Court, which will scru pu lously de cide due sen-
tences for the de struc tion of the coun try”2. The very next day, the exe cu tion of 
Nico lae and Elena Ceauşescu was pub licly an nounced.
Dur ing his first tele vised ap pear ance, Ion Ili escu ac cused the Sec re tary Gen-
eral of the Com mu nist Party (i.e., Ceauşescu) of ”giv ing of fence to the so cial ist ide-
als”3. A few weeks later, Ili escu de clared his at tach ment to ”the com mu nist val ues 
that are im preg nated by Euro pean hu man ism”4. On the ques tion of re spon si bili-
ties, Ion Ili escu made a tri ple dis tinc tion be tween the faith (in the com mu nist ide-
als), the fact of be long ing to the unique party, and one’s in di vid ual ac tions, 
re garded as in evi ta ble un der the com mu nist re gime5.
The is sue of com pe tence was also raised, as com pe tence in the af fairs of the 
State was pre sented as the mo nop oly of for mer party ac tiv ists. Ion Ili escu stated:
”For mer ac tiv ists, even those with im por tant re spon si bili ties, are peo-
ple that did not iden tify them selves with Ceauşescu’s dic ta tor ship or its 
meth ods, but, on the con trary, took a stand and tried to save what was left to 
be saved, them selves be com ing tar gets of re pres sion and mar gin ali za tion”6.
One can eas ily rec og nize in that por trait that of Ion Ili escu him self, who used 
this method to fa cili tate the a pos te ri ori crea tion of the im age of a dis si dent past 
for the for mer top ac tiv ists of the com mu nist party.
The in ven tory of de scrip tions of the fallen re gime in the of fi cial state ments of the 
CFSN and its lead ers in cludes al most ex clu sively for mu las like ”Ceau şist dic ta tor-
ship” and ”Ceau şist re gime”7. The im age of the past pro posed by the CFSN made 
1 The CFSN was formed on December 22, 1989, and functioned thereafter as a leading insti-
tution of the State. Later on, in January 1990, the FSN emerged from the CFSN.
2 Statement of the CFSN, Monitorul Oficial, vol. I, no. 2, December 25, 1989. 
3 Domniţa ŞTEFĂNESCU, Cinci ani din istoria României, Maşina de scris, Bucureşti, 1994, p. 24.
4 Interview in the Figaro magazine, issue of January 6, 1990.
5 ”My departure from the communist dogma came long before December 1989 and was fun-
damental”, a departure from the ”inhuman character and rules of the State that declared itself so-
cialist, but represented instead a form of pre-feudal despotic rule”, TV interview with Paul Şoloc, 
October 6, Dimineaţa, October 11, 1990, p. 3.
6 Discourse of the president of the CFSN at the Free Romanian Broadcasting, Monitorul 
Oficial, January 27, 1990, pp. 1-3/p. 3.
7 Monitorul Oficial, collection of February-June 1990.
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the Com mu nist Party in visi ble be cause the core proc ess of power trans fer took in 
fact place within the elite of the PCR, the 22 De cem ber mo ment was part of the 
his tory of the PCR.
In fact, the in sti tu tional dis ap pear ance of the Com mu nist Party in those mo-
ments is not a sign of the revo lu tion ary in ten tions of the newly emerged lead ing 
team, but rather a method through which the dis ap pear ance of a po liti cal struc-
ture was used as sub sti tute to the real change of po liti cal elite. We wit nessed an in-
sti tu tional revo lu tion that al lowed for a form of con ti nu ity at the level of the 
po liti cal elite. The PCR was not re moved from power in con dem na tion for its mul-
ti ple crimes. The dis course of the lead ers of the new Na tional Sal va tion Front (the 
FSN) eluded such a read ing of the com mu nist re ali ties, de scrib ing the for mer re-
gime as a fa mil ial dic ta tor ship dur ing which the Com mu nist Party, in whose 
name power was ex er cised, had prac ti cally dis ap peared.
Simi lar sce nar ios can be ob served in neighbor ing coun tries like Bul garia1. For 
the Bul gar ian com mu nists,
”the the sis of the per sonal re spon si bil ity of Zy vkov be comes the of fi cial po si-
tion of the Bul gar ian So cial ist Party on the com mu nist past. This the sis per mits 
con demn ing de via tions with out de ny ing the en tire com mu nist leg acy”2.
Still, the origi nal model is the de-Sta lini za tion that oc curred dur ing the time of 
Khru shchev3, when the strong de nun cia tion of Sta lin’s per son al ity cult also had the 
func tion of re ori enting the is sue of re spon si bil ity from the for mer com mu nist lead-
ers to the masses, the lat ter de picted as ac com plices in the achieve ment of a per son-
al ity cult of such pro por tions. The Ro ma nian FSN also used that type of ar gu ment 
in or der to ob tain popu lar sup port for the newly in stalled power, to the det ri ment of 
fear-mon ger ing anti-com mu nist forces. A cor ol lary to the above the sis is the idea 
that for mer key party mem bers suf fered un der the per sonal dic ta tor ship as much as 
the masses, which al lowed the no menk la tura to be come un dis tin guish able from the 
mass of regu lar party mem bers and pre tend that they where also vic tims of the au-
thori tar ian sys tem. This scheme of ar gu men ta tion is to be found in the of fi cial bi og-
ra phies of Ion Ili escu, for mer Min is ter of Youth and Sec re tary for Propa ganda of the 
Cen tral Com mit tee of the PCR, un der Ceauşescu, in the early ’70s.
That type of think ing has sev eral ma jor im pli ca tions. First, this ini tial dec la ra-
tion of the CFSN pro claimed the of fi cial dis so lu tion of the Com mu nist Party, while 
stat ing that its re moval from power was per formed well be fore 1989 by the clan dic-
ta tor ship. As the dis so lu tion thus pro claimed was nei ther a for mal in ter dic tion le-
gally stated, nor a mere no tice of a state of fact – as in those days the struc tures of 
the Com mu nist Party still ex isted –, one can in ter pret this dec la ra tion rather as the 
state ment through which a fac tion de cided the dis so lu tion of the party from within 
the party struc tures.
The first of fi cial dec la ra tion of the CFSN sought to rec on cile two op pos ing im-
pera tives: that of gain ing the ac cep tance of the re volted masses in the street and that 
1 Rumyana KOLAROVA, Dimitr DIMITROV, ”Bulgaria”, in John ELSTER (ed.), The Round-
table Talks and the Breakdown of Communism, University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 
1996, pp. 178-212.
2 Marta TOUZKOVA, ”The Genesis of a Successor Party in Bulgaria”, Raisons politiques, no. 3, 
Aug.-Oct. 2001, pp. 127-138/p. 130.
3 Kathleen E. SMITH, New Russia Politics and Memory during the Yeltsin Era, Cornell Univer-
sity Press, Ithaca and London, 2002, p. 31.
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of as cer tain ing the loy alty of the mem bers of the for mer ad mini stra tion. By not 
con demn ing the PCR, the CFSN was re as sur ing the mem bers of the ad mini stra-
tion, while by not men tion ing it it achieved the ad her ence of the masses.
The at ti tude im plicit in the first CFSN state ment was only re in forced by what 
was pre sented as an im mi nent threat of civil war, made more vivid by the ex is-
tence of armed guer ril las loyal to the for mer dic ta tor and ready for com bat in the 
streets. Facts where pre sented in such a man ner as to en sure the rapid ac cep tance 
of the new po liti cal struc ture as a guar an tee for sta bil ity, not only be cause it re-
sponded to the claims of the re volted masses, but also be cause it rep re sented a 
form of con ti nu ity with the for mer struc tures.
An other im por tant im pli ca tion of this type of ap proach tran spires from the 
mem ber ship list of the new Coun cil of the FSN, as cer tain con clu sions can be 
drawn sim ply by ana lyz ing the com po si tion of the new power. Petre Ro man, first 
post-com mu nist prime min is ter, claims in his mem oirs that even since the night of 
De cem ber 22nd to 23rd,
”the power has been mo nopo lized, or at least ex tremely in flu enced, by for-
mer com mu nists that had no other de sire but to re store to the fallen re gime 
a pseudo-le giti macy that Ceauşescu had de stroyed, through an op era tion 
al most en tirely ’cos metic’”1.
The first dec la ra tion of the FSN states that
”all min is tries and cen tral or gan isms in their pre sent form are to con tinue their 
nor mal ac tiv ity and ac knowl edge the con trol of the Na tional Sal va tion Front, 
in or der to en sure the nor mal course of the en tire eco nomic and so cial life”2.
Only a few days later, re gional bu reauc racy was to be regu lated in a simi lar 
man ner:
”The spe cific ap pa ra tus of the com mit tees and bu reaus of the for mer 
Popu lar Coun cils, of the lo cal ad min is tra tive or gan isms, and also of the lo-
cal socio-cul tural in sti tu tions are to con tinue their ac tiv ity with the pre sent 
struc tures”3.
Be fore the first free elec tions of May 20, 1990, Ion Ili escu, then can di date for the 
Presi dency and act ing Presi dent, ex plained this con ti nu ity thus, ”They could not 
be blamed merely for the rea son that they were part of the for mer ad min is tra tive 
struc tures”4. Con cur rently, Ion Ili escu was voic ing strong criti cism against the ”po-
liti cal ama teurs”5, such as were pro moted by the Petre Ro man gov ern ment: ”They 
found them selves min is ter or prime min is ter when they had not even run a work-
shop be fore”6. In this view, only those who have pre vi ously oc cu pied ex ecu tive 
1 Petre ROMAN, Le devoir de liberté, Payot, Paris, 1992, pp. 118-119.
2 Communicate of the CFSN, Monitorul Oficial, vol. I, no.1, December 22, 1989.
3 ”The Decree-Law on the Formation, Organization and Functioning of the CFSN and of the 
Regional Councils of the FSN”, Monitorul Oficial, December 27, vol. I, no. 4, 1989, pp. 2-3/p. 3.
4 Ion Iliescu, interview in Tineretul Liber, May 9-10, reproduced in IDEM, Momente de istorie. 
Documente, interviuri, comentarii, decembrie 1989-iunie 1990, Editura Enciclopedică, Bucureşti, 
1995, pp. 270-284/p. 278.
5 Ion ILIESCU, Revoluţie şi reformă, Editura Enciclopedică, Bucureşti, 1994, p. 94.
6 Adevărul, October 9, 1996, p. 1.
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po si tions, i.e., in the com mu nist struc tures, could be con sid ered com pe tent. Thus, 
the Ro ma nian act ing Presi dent of the mo ment (May 1990) was de plor ing what he 
con sid ered to be the un de sir able ef fect of an ex ces sive purge. In a post-elec tion 
analy sis per formed two years later, af ter the con flicts within the FSN were ex tin-
guished, Ion Ili escu de nounced the fol low ing:
”What has grown into a se ri ous handi cap was the fact that we backed 
down in front of cer tain pres sures and an ar chic and dema gogic ac tions, 
which re sulted in the dis missal of quali fied per sons, trained and ex peri enced 
in eco nomic and mana ge rial ac tivi ties. The sus tained cam paign of in duc ing 
gen eral cul pa bil ity in so ci ety and in its mem bers is pro foundly dam ag ing, 
and of a de struc tive na ture“1.
From this stand point, the fail ures of the post-com mu nist pe riod came as a re-
sult of the will to re place for mer ac tiv ists. This type of dis course was joined to gether 
with a par ticu lar in ter pre ta tion of the re la tion ship be tween the for mer Com mu nist 
Party and so ci ety:
”The party mem ber ship card only at tested that its owner knew the 
rules of the to tali tar ian so ci ety. In fact, every in di vid ual who had a mini mal 
com pe tence, who wanted to suc ceed pro fes sion ally, had to be come a mem-
ber of the Ro ma nian Com mu nist Party (PCR), which, there fore, com prised 
our en tire so ci ety“2.
This vi sion, how ever, as sumed that the to tali tar ian pro ject was ful filled.
On the sec ond an ni ver sary of the fall of the com mu nist re gime, Ion Ili escu de-
clared be fore the Par lia ment: ”The Com mu nist Party has dis ap peared from the po-
liti cal scene of the coun try. This was not as a con se quence of vio lent ac tions, but a 
step in a new his tori cal age”3. Thus the for mer unique party was not con demned 
in the name of cer tain val ues, but rather on ac count of a his tori cal junc ture. Fol low-
ing this logic, Ili escu also stated, ”we have the duty to build, and not to de struct”4, 
be cause ”we can not ig nore the con struc tive ac tivi ties and all the ef forts of the peo-
ple for the past 45 years”5.
In an of fi cial bi og ra phy of Ion Ili escu, pub lished be fore the elec tions of May 
1990, we read, ”when Ceauşescu started put ting his dia bolic pro jects into prac tice 
[…], Ion Ili escu said NO. For al most 20 years af ter wards, Ili escu suf fered di rect and 
in di rect pres sures, open or hid den threats”6. As Ili escu stated, ”Many are those who 
ac cuse my past. I have no shame of my past. Let the su preme judge be the citi zen, 
the elec tor ate of this coun try”7. The re fusal to feel re gret for the past cor re sponds to 
the re fusal to con demn the com mu nist past as a whole. Ion Ili escu’s po si tion, there-
fore, was to in flu ence the of fi cial po si tion of the State and to crys tal lize the dis course 
1 Ion ILIESCU, ”Discourse Two Years after Elections”, May 20, 1992, IDEM, Momente de isto-
rie…cit., vol. III, Editura Enciclopedică, Bucureşti, 1996, pp. 162-170/p. 168.
2 IDEM, Revolutie şi reformă, cit., p. 108.
3 Discourse before the Parliament, December 1991, IDEM, Momente de istorie…cit., vol. III, 
pp. 113-127/p. 115.
4 Speech given by Ion Iliescu, Azi, December 18, 1990, p. 1.
5 Ibidem.
6 Biography of Ion Iliescu, Dimineaţa, May 18, 1990.
7 Discourse of Ion Iliescu in the district of Teleorman, Dimineaţa, April 19, 1992.
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of the op po si tion, de fined as a counter im age to it. Ili escu ad dressed his mes sage 
es pe cially to for mer party mem bers and their col lec tive mem ory, re mind ing them 
of their past po si tion1:
“The dan ger came from the set ting loose of vis ceral ten den cies in the 
con text of a pas sion ate ex al ta tion, which could trans form the popu lar dis con-
tent into a blood shed, a time when eve ry one would seek to ‘pay back debts’ 
and when the gen eral ex as pera tion could turn against party mem bers and 
the armed forces, risk ing a jus ti fied de fense re flex. The risk of a civil war was 
to be avoided at all costs”2.
Al most eve ry thing could be jus ti fied in this way, from the vio lence against the 
op po si tion par ties (Janu ary 29, 1990) to the sum mon ing of the min ers to Bu cha rest 
and the re pres sive stance taken against the dem on stra tion that oc curred in the Uni-
ver sity Square. In brief, through out the tran si tion pe riod that type of logic jus ti fied 
what was to be called the ”pol icy of for get ting”. The best way to make such le ni ency 
the rule was to pre sent it as a proc ess in the best in ter est of all. Lucian Boia men tions 
a ”method of ig nor ing” ap plied by the Ro ma nian post-com mu nist power3. Shortly 
be fore the 1990 elec tions, the daily news pa per of the FSN pub lished a col umn en ti-
tled ”The temp ta tion and the il lu sion of re venge”4, which ar gued: ”Un der the mask 
of anti-com mu nism they ac cuse the masses, the di rect manu fac tur ers of gen eral 
goods”5. The mem ory of com mu nism was pre sented as es sen tially dan ger ous for the 
ma jor ity. From then on, the ex cul pa tion of the PCR and the for mer po liti cal po lice, 
the Se cu ri tate, went hand in hand with the in crimi na tion of the ma jor ity, so that any 
kind of ac count abil ity be came vir tu ally im pos si ble.
The status of for mer Com mu nist Party mem bers, and of their higher ranks, is, 
ac cord ingly, a cen tral ele ment in the shap ing of a post-com mu nist or der6. The 
same as in Rus sia,
”one con se quence of the rela tively peace ful tran si tion from com mu nism to 
post-com mu nism is, there fore, to leave the rem nants of a large and pow er ful 
elite in their po si tions of privi lege: a po tent source of cleav age in the emerg-
ing poli tics”7.
A trauma such as a revo lu tion ary event can cast doubt on the very pil lars of a po-
liti cal cul ture8. In this con text, the con ti nu ity of the PCR was com pletely re de fined by 
the fall of com mu nism. The re la tion ship of the FSN with the for mer struc tures must 
1 These allegations chose to ignore the fact that even the most radical anticommunist state-
ments of certain CDR members never referred to this global category, but only to the activists of 
the former unique party. The same idea is flaunted in 1996, when they claimed that ”the CDR 
will introduce certain restrictions for the former members of the PCR”, Electoral advertising for 
Ion Iliescu, Adevărul, November 7, 1996.
2 Ion ILIESCU, Revoluţie şi reformă, cit., p. 51.
3 Lucian BOIA, Istorie şi mit în conştiinţa românească, Humanitas, Bucureşti, 1997, pp. 183, 186.
4 Marin BADEA, Azi, May 18, 1990, p. 3.
5 BT, ”Warning”, Azi, July 4, 1990, p. 1. We could also interpret this as a new sign of black-
mailing with the Securitate files. 
6 Ian Mc ALLISTER, Stephen WHITE, Richard ROSE, ”Communists, Privilege, and Post-Com-
munism in Russia”, International Politics, no. 34, March 1997, pp. 79-95/p. 86.
7 Ibidem, p. 92.
8 Serge BERNSTEIN (ed.), Les cultures politiques en France, Seuil, Paris, 1999, p. 29.
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be re garded as a com po nent of this trans for ma tion, which trans lated as a genu ine 
dif fi culty for the FSN to claim any po liti cal tra di tion for its own.
Na tion al ism and the Is sue of the Con ti nu ity of the State
The de nun cia tion of po liti cal ad ver sar ies as ene mies of the na tion was a very 
fre quent oc cur rence in the pub li ca tions of the FSN and its al lies. They launched 
claims that what known anti-com mu nists, like the dis si dent Do ina Cor nea or the 
presi dent of the Na tional Peas ant Party, Cor ne liu Co posu, wanted was to ”sell the 
coun try”1. The FSN daily Azi sug gested that such po liti cal play ers would best 
leave the coun try and ”form a gov ern ment in ex ile”2.The anti-com mu nist dan ger 
and the threat of a Hun gar ian in va sion in Tran syl va nia were pre sented as two 
faces of the same medal.
Kathe rine Verd ery ob serves that the peo ple in power in post-com mu nist 
Ro ma nia
”would have seen no risks, in 1990, to imi tate the de moc ratic and civil-so ci ety 
rheto ric of their ana logues in Hun gary and Czecho slo va kia. As it hap pened, 
that cal cu la tion proved er ro ne ous. The Ro ma nian Com mu nist Party, in al li-
ance with some of the same na tion al ists who now sup port the PDSR, had 
sub stan tially strength ened the al ready po tent po liti cal sym bol, ’na tion’, in-
creas ing its ca pac ity to struc ture fields of dis course. In mak ing use of it in 
post-1989 strug gles, the PDSR and their na tion al ist al lies were wield ing the 
most pow er ful weapon in the sym bolic ar se nal of Ro ma nian poli tics”3.
Fol low ing the na tion al ist tra di tion, the FSN/PDSR ob tained an iden tity – 
which it would never openly ad mit – as a de facto suc ces sor of the Ro ma nian Com-
mu nist Party. How ever, Ion Ili escu’s sup port ers on the one hand would profit 
from their le giti macy as ac tive par tici pants in the ”Ro ma nian 1989 Revo lu tion”, 
while on the other would use the dis cur sive leg acy and the terms of so cial capi tal 
of the for mer Com mu nist Party, thus truly es tab lish ing them selves as the cul tural, 
if not the in sti tu tional, heirs of the Com mu nist Party.
The re la tion ship of the FSN with the in sti tu tional leg acy of the com mu nist 
State was marked by the ab sence of a clear de mar ca tion be tween the con cept of 
the party of the FSN, which was for mally founded on Feb ru ary 6, 1990, un der the 
presi dency of Ion Ili escu, and the struc tures of re gional and cen tral ad mini stra tion 
that were com po nents of the Na tional Sal va tion Front up un til its con ver sion. The 
FSN was not an ex-com mu nist party, but was the di rect prod uct of the struc tures 
of the com mu nist state as they were at the mo ment of the changes of De cem ber 
1989. This pro pin quity of the FSN to in sti tu tions run by the logic of the Unique 
1 Dan ZAMFIRESCU, ”Sfârşitul lambadei”, Azi, May 10, 1990, p. 1. In the press affiliated to 
the power, Corneliu Coposu was accused, in ”letters from the readers” published on the front 
page, to had been ”sold the country” (Adevărul, January 30, 1990, p. 1); similar accusations were 
launched against Doina Cornea (Adevărul, February 18, 1990, p. 1).
2 Azi, July 8, 1990, p. 1.
3 Katherine VERDERY, What Was Socialism and What Comes Next?, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, New Jersey, 1996, p. 44.
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Party made its dis course di rectly de pend ent on the com mu nist past and ques-
tioned its auton omy.
The dis course that pic tured the State as sole guard ian of the na tional in ter est 
pro vided the for mer po liti cal elite with com fort able po si tions as ser vants of the 
State, and there fore ser vants to the in ter ests of an eter nal Ro ma nia. These ar gu-
ments sum up the source of the anti-anti-com mu nist at ti tude of the FSN/PDSR, 
later to be come the PSD, which held that any form of criti cism of the com mu nist 
past was against the na tional in ter est, a po si tion which was con se quence of the 
new found le giti macy of the for mer po liti cal elite and of the non criti cal in clu sion 
of the com mu nist pe riod in the very defi ni tion of the coun try’s na tional iden tity.
The most im por tant in sti tu tional ”prod uct” of the FSN was as am bigu ous as 
the dis course of the FSN on the past. Still, it, too, came as a so lu tion to the is sue of 
con sti tu tional con ti nu ity. The ar ti cle 151(1) of the 1991 Con sti tu tion stated, ”the in-
sti tu tions of the Re pub lic that are in ex is tence at the mo ment when the pre sent Con-
sti tu tion comes into force shall re main in ex is tence un til the for ma tion of new 
in sti tu tions”, which is as if the ”Re pub lic” was de fin ing the com mu nist re gime and 
the fol low ing pe riod at the same time1. Daniel Barbu ob serves that
”the Con sti tu tion of De cem ber 1991 is con ceived so as to en sure the con ti nu ity 
of the State and of the for mer elite, who had al ready learned how to gov ern it, 
and not to fa cili tate the de vel op ment of a po liti cal func tion within the Ro ma-
nian so ci ety, thus pre vent ing the emer gence of a dif fer ent type of elite”2.
The Ro ma nian Com mu nist Party elite per ceived the Revo lu tion as the mo-
ment of an abrupt change in their sym bolic sys tem of rep re sen ta tion, but they 
were re warded for it by per sist ing in po liti cal power. Thus, con ti nu ity and change 
proved to be not only com pati ble, but also com ple men tary to one an other.
The strat egy of re in stat ing and re mo bi liz ing ex-PCR mem bers was a con stant 
pre oc cu pa tion of the FSN/PDSR and the PRM, while pre sent ing the de moc ratic 
op po si tion par ties, es pe cially the his tori cal par ties, as a di rect threat to such 
ex-mem bers. In the enu mera tion of vari ous ac tions of de com mu ni za tion pre suma-
bly in tended by the his tori cal par ties – even if never ac knowl edged –, ac cu sa tions 
of ten sprung up to the ef fect that the lives of the 4 mil lion ex-com mu nist mem bers 
would be put in dan ger. Thus, Ili escu and the PDSR/PSD were the only guar an tee 
for the ”peace of Ro ma ni ans”.
The strat egy of for get ting was not the con se quence of a nec es sary rec on cilia-
tion, but the con tinua tion of a to tali tar ian type of strat egy of le giti macy that re-
vealed mass cul pa bil ities and made al leged ac com plices out of com mon citi zens. It 
was a form of le giti macy that had its roots in fear and con straint. The suc cess of this 
strat egy is il lus trated by the ap par ent popu lar ity of the ”clean ing-up” ac tions car-
ried out in the Uni ver sity Square on June 13, 1990, first by the po lice forces and then 
by the min ers – both of them ex tremely vio lent. It re veals to what ex tent the Uni ver-
sity Square mani fes ta tion was per ceived as an ac cu sa tion against the rest of the 
popu la tion. This ef fect is com pa ra ble to the suc cess that the for mer com mu nist re-
gime had reg is tered in trans form ing its si lent vic tims into so-called ac com plices.
1 See Eleodor FOCŞĂNEANU, Istoria constituţională a României 1859-1991, Humanitas, 
Bucureşti, 1998.
2 Daniel BARBU, Republica absentă, Nemira, Bucureşti, 1999, pp. 126-127.
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In sum, the leg acy ap pro pri ated by the FSN when us ing a na tion al ist dis course 
was a val ori za tion of one of the main themes of Ceau şist propa ganda1, and sub se-
quently a re val ori za tion of the com mu nist past. There fore, when the dis course 
openly ad dressed the is sue of the past, it al ways re mained am bigu ous. The re cent 
past was mainly rep re sented as a cele bra tion of the mo ment of the ”De cem ber Revo-
lu tion”, but the sig nifi cance of the mo ment was never dis cussed. Re mem ber ing the 
revo lu tion ary mo ments was not sup posed to mean any thing; it was only a rit ual 
that could ”serve po liti cal or gani za tions by pro duc ing bonds of soli dar ity with out 
re quir ing uni form ity of be lief”2. Thus the am bi gu ity proved to be po liti cally pro duc-
tive, but the scores would be set tled at the mo ment of the FSN rup ture in 1992.
Ion Ili escu’s Party and the Com mu nist Leg acy
The pre sent PSD is the re sult of an in ter nal clari fi ca tion that took place be-
tween the con ser va tives and the re form ists within the FSN, when, in 1992, the 
FDSN – later to be come the PDSR – (and Ion Ili escu) de tached them selves from the 
FSN, on a po liti cal plat form that criti cized the re form ist FSN leader Petre Ro man.
At first glance, the PSD ap pears nei ther nos tal gic, nor anti-com mu nist. It is, in 
fact, em ploy ing both types of dis courses de pend ing on the con text, as it does not 
have a clear view on the past, one that could be used to le giti mate its own ac tions. 
What I am try ing to ar gue next is that this point of view is chal lenged by the way 
in which the party de fined it self and shaped its iden tity. The call for the for ma tion 
of the new party fo cused on the re fusal to copy the model of lib eral de moc ra cies, 
a model that, in con trast, had been praised by the re form ist lead ers of the FSN and 
the ”his tori cal” par ties:
”Our fun da men tal idea is that the forms of po liti cal, eco nomic and 
socio-cul tural or gani za tion could not be im posed by force, could not be cop-
ied me chani cally, as they need to cor re spond to the tra di tion, hab its, and 
level of cul ture and con scious ness spe cific to the peo ple”3.
This fun da men tal act of the PDSR is an il lus tra tive ex am ple of post-com mu-
nist con ser va tism and helps un der stand the link be tween Ion Ili escu’s ideas about 
an ”origi nal de moc racy” and his party’s search not for a so cial de moc racy, but for 
a ”so cial” de moc racy. In other words, peo ple around Presi dent Ili escu wished to 
ap ply a dis tinct model, dif fer ent from the West ern one, ex plic itly ex press ing their 
in ten tion to take ”what was good” in the com mu nist sys tem.
Ili escu’s party am bi tion was to for mu late a pro gram of lim ited re forms and 
then to vali date it as the ”pro gram of the Ro ma nian Revo lu tion”. Ion Ili escu stated: 
”Aren’t we fed up with 45 years of ap ply ing for eign mod els? Those who have re-
jected im posed mod els now come to us and ask us to copy other mod els?”4, while 
1 Katherine VERDERY, Compromis şi rezistenţă, Romanian transl. by Mona Antohi, Sorin 
Antohi, Humanitas, Bucureşti, 1994 (1991), p. 22.
2 David I. KERTZER, Rituals, Politics and Power, Yale University, New Haven and London, 
1989, p. 67.
3 ”Appeal of the Provisory National Council of the FSN on December 22”, Dimineaţa, 
April 8, 1992.
4 Ion ILIESCU, Dimineaţa, March 27, 1990. 
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also claim ing, ”we have made a des potic, au thori tar ian, to tali tar ian, re gime fall, a 
re gime that had noth ing to do with the gen er ous ideas of so cial ism”1.
Not sur pris ingly, in 2000, the then presi dent of the PDSR turned PSD, Adrian 
Năs tase, still be lieved in the unity of the whole so ci ety be hind the party, ”we 
need grad ual po liti cal open ings, in or der to en sure the soli dar ity of the pub lic 
opin ion as well as more pres tige on the in ter na tional scene” 2, since ”last ing paths 
de mand con sen sus”3.
Af ter 1992, one could see that the re con sid era tion of the past served as a di-
rect ar gu ment for choos ing the fu ture path imag ined by Ion Ili escu and his sup-
port ers, a path ex plic itly non-capi tal is tic4 and po liti cally sym bol ized by the 
FDSN/PDSR al li ance with ex trem ist par ties like the Great Ro ma nia Party (PRM), 
the PUNR and the PSM. The re jec tion of the West ern model is a choice that can 
only be un der stood in the con text of the na tion al ism and xeno pho bia put for ward 
in of fi cial dis courses. Pur port ing to be on the side of those who suf fered dur ing 
post-com mu nism, the FDSN/PDSR criti cized this pe riod, thus re ha bili tat ing the 
for mer re gime. This re ha bili ta tion gave some le giti macy to the radi cal nos tal gic 
dis course of its po liti cal al lies, the PSM (the Work ers’ So cial ist Party), and the 
PRM (the Great Ro ma nia Party).
The FDSN/PDSR’s at tach ment to the con ti nu ity of the State in sti tu tions was 
not only a way to jus tify the con ti nu ity of the po liti cal elite, but also a way to ac-
cuse the main ad ver sar ies (the CDR) by al lud ing to an in com pati bil ity be tween 
anti-com mu nism and na tional in ter est:
”De spite the re gime, the po liti cal and so cial struc tures on this world, 
the Ro ma nian peo ple have ac cu mu lated a pat ri mony that could not be sac ri-
ficed for ideo logi cal rea sons. It would be an at tack against our na tional as 
well as hu man iden tity, be cause all these peo ple have paid enor mous prices 
and that is why no one could con fis cate their achieve ments”5.
The re ha bili ta tion of the global re al ity of the com mu nist pe riod is made im-
pos si ble by the un fa vor able com pari son with the pre sent. How ever, some re ali ties 
of the com mu nist pe riod can be quali fied as posi tive, and there fore the tran si tion 
pe riod can be pre sented as guilty for de stroy ing them. That type of ar gu ment 
strength ened the opin ion that one cause for the dif fi cul ties en coun tered af ter 1989 
was the de struc tion of cer tain pre-1989 in sti tu tional mecha nisms, con se quently at-
tack ing the ar gu ments that sup ported that change. As a cor ol lary, this dis course re-
futed the posi tive grounds for in crimi nat ing the peo ple with a po liti cal car rier 
un der the com mu nist re gime.
For the po liti cal sup port ers of Ion Ili escu be long ing to that po liti cal spec trum, 
the com mu nist past is clearly split in two: the pe riod prior to the ’60s – a pe riod of po-
liti cal pris ons, crimes, So vieti za tion, obe di ence to Mos cow – and that fol low ing, dur-
ing which the na tional sen ti ment started to be praised by the Ro ma nian com mu nists. 
Rele vant for this point of view is the po si tion of the PSD for mer Min is ter of Jus tice, 
1 IDEM, Dimineaţa, October 1, 1990.
2 Adrian NĂSTASE, Bătălia pentru viitor, New Open Media, Bucureşti, 2000, p. 21.
3 Ibidem.
4 Even in the electoral campaign for the 2000 elections, the PDSR press release demanded 
that the privatization of State factories should be stopped, arguing that ”capitalist economy has 
social polarization as its main target”, in Adevărul, October 5, 2000.
5 Ion ILIESCU, Revoluţie şi reformă, cit., p. 198.
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Rodica Stănoiu, who claimed that in the 1969 Pe nal Code one could find ”an other 
ex am ple, as if we needed an other one, as to how, and at whose hands, and why So-
vieti za tion took place”1. This idea al ready ap peared in 1990, when the of fi cial FSN 
daily, the Azi, criti cized the anti-com mu nist dis course by at tack ing the state ment 
of the phi loso pher Gabriel Liiceanu, who de nounced ”the past 40, not 20 years”2 
of dic ta tor ship. For the Azi, ”such a the sis will not stand the test of a socio-his toric 
analy sis, at least for the 1965-1971 pe riod”3.
The se ver ity of the cur rent cri ses be came the main ar gu ment for mov ing the 
is sue of com mu nist abuses down on the pri or ity list. This dis course, which cast a 
shadow on all at tempts to ques tion the to tali tar ian past, em pha sized the pri ori ties 
of the pre sent as preva lent over the is sues of the past, which must re main pro-
tected through for get ting. The past was evoked only to avoid any lin ger ing on this 
is sue. In keep ing with the at ti tude of the FSN be tween 1990-1992, the pri macy of 
the pre sent strength ened the pol icy of for get ting. For Ion Ili escu, the ar gu ment for 
for get ting and con ser va tism was the dan ger of a de com mu ni za tion dis or der: ”We 
have suc ceeded in win ing over chaos and an ar chy. We have suc ceeded in avoid-
ing civil war and the dis man tling of the State and of the na tion” 4.
As Ion Ili escu fur ther de clared:
”While mov ing away from the past, it would be un just and un dig ni fied 
to ig nore the con struc tive ef forts of the peo ple for 45 years […] our aim is to 
build, not de stroy. It is time to have a bal anced at ti tude, to use a re spon si ble 
criti cal judg ment when con front ing the na tional des tiny. To grant us the 
clause of con fi dence in our selves”5.
Thus, the self-con fi dence of the peo ple was pre sented as linked to a re val ori za-
tion of the re cent past, and a posi tive mem ory of this past was strongly en cour aged.
The need for a posi tive ver sion of the re cent past is com mon among popu la tions 
that have lived through a to tali tar ian pe riod and do not want to sim ply turn their 
backs on their en tire lives6. We must no tice that all types of nos tal gia are nec es sar ily 
anti-de moc ratic. The FSN tried to con vert to de moc racy part of the com mu nist leg-
acy (peo ple, in sti tu tions and at ti tudes) that it con sid ered use ful and posi tive.
As a con clu sion to the above ob ser va tions, one must ad mit that there have 
been some at tempts to re ha bili tate the com mu nist re gime, but since their aim was 
mainly to neu tral ize the dis course on the ne ces sity for de com mu ni za tion, they can 
be con sid ered re sponses to the anti-com mu nist dis course of the op po si tion.
The Pol icy of For get ting
The pol icy of for get ting thus ap pears as a stra te gic choice made by Ion Ili escu 
and his sup port ers in the mat ter of their re la tion ship with the com mu nist re gime. 
1 Monitorul Oficial, May 15, 1997, p. 2.
2 Vladimir SOMEŞAN, ”Paternalismul domnului Liiceanu”, Azi, no. 1, April 11, 1990, p. 3.
3 Ibidem.
4 Ion ILIESCU, The electoral program ”I believe in Romania’s change for the better”, 
Momente de istorie…cit., vol. III, pp. 313-331/p. 315.
5 Ibidem, p. 322.
6 Kathleen E. SMITH, Mythmaking in the New Russia. Politics and Memory during the Yeltsin 
Era, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 2002, pp. 75-83.
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This pol icy is best summed up by the re flex of its ar chi tects to stop, or at least slow 
down, the open ac cess to the ar chives of the for mer re gime, es pe cially those of the 
Com mu nist Party and the po liti cal po lice. This at ti tude to wards the past is also 
char ac ter ized by the fact that it ad mit ted the abuses of the for mer re gime, while 
deem ing that such a rec og ni tion did not have to have prac ti cal con se quences, as 
such ac tions would only be a mir ror im age of those of the past. This was how the 
status quo was jus ti fied by the very de sire to avoid the past abuses, con se quently 
turn ing the at ti tudes of con dem na tion of this past away from the idea of just repa-
ra tion. The pol icy of for get ting was an ex pected re sult of the two-faced dis course 
of the PSD, which in cluded slo gans such as ”we must build, not de stroy”, and ”all 
col labo ra tors, all in no cents”.
The PDSR also claimed that if Cor ne liu Co posu, the presi dent of the de moc-
ratic op po si tion, the CDR, would come to power: ”He would at tack 2000 per sons 
of the for mer no menk la tura. This peo ple will be purged” 1. In 1996, the PDSR elec-
toral cam paign asked vot ers to sup port their can di date for the Presi dency ”to 
avoid wit ness ing a wave of tri als, witch hunts and re pri sals” 2.
The PDSR at ti tude to wards the laws of prop erty res ti tu tion and to wards 
those for open ac cess to the se cret po lice ar chives re veals the de gree of in flu ence 
that its re la tion ship with the past had on its cur rent ac tions. Al though in ter preted 
by some as a sign of fi nan cial in ter est, the de sire to keep cer tain real es tate in the 
pos ses sion of the for mer no menk la tura, thus main tain ing a cap tive elec tor ate, is 
above all con sis tent with the PDSR vi sion of his tory. The PDSR con sid ered le giti-
miz ing some com mu nist abuses as part of a more am ple de sire to le giti mate the 
en tire re gime. This at ti tude also shows an at tach ment to the con ti nu ity of leg is la-
tion from one re gime to the other.
Ten years af ter the fall of com mu nism, the sus pen sion of the sen tence pro-
nounced against the com mu nist gen er als an swer able for the Ti mi şoara crimes re-
vealed a PDSR that feared to pro nounce a gen eral am nesty, but ap plied it de facto.
The PDSR strongly pro tested against all the sen tences pro nounced be tween 
1996 and 2000, es pe cially on the oc ca sion when a sen tence was ut tered against the 
com mu nist gen er als and for mer min is ters of de fense and in ter nal af faires, gen er-
als Vic tor Atana sie Stăn culescu and Mi hai Chi ţac. Ion Ili escu, as Presi dent of the 
PDSR, ap praised the sen tence as a ”ju di cial er ror”3 and ac cused the ju di cial sys-
tem of be ing sub or di nated to the new po liti cal ma jor ity and of try ing to ”re write 
his tory while tak ing par ti san po si tions”4. In his opin ion, ”we can not ig nore the 
com plex char ac ter of the Revo lu tion […] these gen er als de serve our ap pre cia-
tion”, since they sup ported the Revo lu tion in the end5. Is to be noted that there is 
no law of am nesty ei ther for the pe riod prior to 1989, nor spe cifi cally for the mis do-
ings of De cem ber 1989, when the army and the Se cu ri tate changed sides and fi-
nally sup ported the re volt. How ever, in the pe riod 1990-1996, as well as af ter 2001, 
we have wit nessed an in for mal am nesty, since the jus tice sys tem has not han dled 
any cases on the 1989 re volt or on prior abuses.
This de facto am nesty, along with the pol icy of for get ting, man aged to sus pend 
all de bate on the com mu nist past, and of fered there fore the free dom to ma nipu late 
1 Ion ILIESCU, Interview in Revista 22, September 25, 1992, p. 7.
2 Electoral advertising for the PDSR, Dimineaţa, November 13-14, 1992, p. 1.
3 Press agency Mediafax, July 15, 1999.
4 Adevărul, July 20, 1999.
5 Press Agency Mediafax, July 15, 1999.
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the past. This shows the will of the PDSR to pre sent the ap peals for jus tice of the vic-
tims of com mu nist abuses as po liti cally driven. The ab sence of a de jure am nesty 
pre served the con fu sion be tween judg ing the events of De cem ber 1989 and judg-
ing those dur ing the con stant re pres sion prior to 1989. Natu rally, the ar gu ments for 
an am nesty of deeds com mit ted dur ing the revo lu tion ary events are more sus cep ti-
ble to ob tain a cer tain con sen sus than those re fer ring to the en tire com mu nist pe-
riod. The fo cus on the is sue of the le giti macy of the trial against the com mu nist 
gen er als in volved both in the re pres sion of the De cem ber 1989 re volt and, af ter 
chang ing sides, in the fall of the to tali tar ian re gime con trib uted to the con fu sion 
over the is sue of le giti macy of any trial that im pli cated the to tali tar ian pe riod.
Even to day, the PSD (for mer PDSR) is try ing to sal vage the im age of ex-lead-
ers of the com mu nist state. For ex am ple, in 2002 they in cluded in the Gal lery of 
Por traits that dis played the presi dents of for mer rep re sen ta tive as sem blies the 
presi dents of the com mu nist Great Na tional As sem bly, an or gan that used to vali-
date the de ci sions of the Com mu nist Party. That is how, in di rectly, this com mu nist 
in sti tu tion found its place in the his tory of genu ine rep re sen ta tive as sem blies of 
the pe ri ods be fore 1948 and af ter 19891.
It is to be noted that the PDSR feared that it was not per fectly con trol ling its 
po liti cal iden tity, and that the ma jor ity did not share its vi sion of the re cent past. 
That is why the 2000 pro gram stated that:
”Un for tu nately the right wing suc ceeded to a great ex tent to in flu ence 
ideo logi cally the cul tural and in tel lec tual arena, through the mass me dia and 
the civil so ci ety. These forces try to im pose their par ti san cri te ria of le giti-
macy and of cul tural and po liti cal pro gress. Their vi sion of mod ern his tory, 
pro foundly de formed, is pro moted in a non criti cal man ner by the mass me-
dia and the edu ca tional sys tem”2.
Far from be ing a bru tal nos tal gic vi sion, this type of re la tion to the com mu nist 
past sought to be con sis tent with the mo ment of the 1989 revo lu tion, at the same 
time avoid ing a to tal con dem na tion of the re gime and its sup port ers like the one 
in the model of the Czech lus tra tion. This par tial con dem na tion of the com mu nist 
past jus ti fied the cho sen type of con ver sion of the no menk la tura, from within State 
in sti tu tions, and, from the pub lic, en sured a re spect abil ity that, theo reti cally, could 
only have been gained af ter a clear sepa ra tion from to tali tar ian prac tices.
Af ter 2001, the mo ment of their re turn to power, Ion Ili escu and the PSD’s 
radi cal change of dis course and po si tion con cern ing the past (as, for in stance, to-
wards the for mer Ro ma nian king, the Ra dio Free Europe, etc.) ap peared cir cum-
stan tial and for mal, in tended to play down the theme of the com mu nist past by 
sup port ing themes ex clu sively em braced by anti-com mu nists in the early ’90s. 
This ap par ent ”con ver sion” was chal lenged by the civil so ci ety in the face of at-
tempts from the PSD/PDSR to pre vent the proper func tion ing of the in sti tu tion 
cre ated to study the ar chives of the po liti cal po lice.
This am biva lent PSD pol icy of ac cep tance and utili za tion of the mem ory of 
the com mu nist pe riod is simi lar to the dis course of the po liti cal heirs of for mer 
1 The portrait of Drăghici, a figure definitely involved in the communist crimes of the ’50s, 
was kept on following a decision of the Permanent Bureau of the Chamber of Deputies on 
December 10, 2002.
2 The Political Program of the PDSR, September 21, 2000, p. 13.
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unique par ties in Hun gary or Po land. How ever, as the PSD does not take up this 
leg acy, the nos tal gic di men sion of their dis course is even more strik ing, and the at-
tempts to draw a line be tween the PSD and the PCR be come even less credi ble. The 
lack of an in sti tu tional ac tor that, in the new de moc ratic re al ity, should take re spon-
si bil ity for the com mu nist past, the lack of poli cies of de com mu ni za tion and the 
fact that ac cess to re sources is still un der the in flu ence of the for mer po liti cal elite, 
obliges us to iden tify the PSD as the genu ine heir of the Ro ma nian Com mu nist 
Party, de spite the nu ances that must be taken into ac count. Re gard ing the at ti tude 
to wards the past, this con ti nu ity is even more ob vi ous than it was 19 years ago.
In these set tings, the price that has to be paid is the in ca pac ity to re write the 
his tory of Ro ma nia in view of the de moc ratic val ues. As Jan Werner Mul ler 
pointed out:
”Po liti cal el ites can play a posi tive moral role by es tab lish ing power over 
mem ory, and re cast ing his tori cal guilt and griev ances in such a way that they 
fur ther rather than hin der the emer gence of a de moc ratic po liti cal cul ture”1.
A ma jor pro por tion of the Ro ma nian po liti cal elite per ceive such an en ter-
prise as anti-com mu nist and as threat en ing. At the same time, it makes ef forts to 
in crease the choices of mo bi li za tion and soli dar ity of those who, be ing linked to 
the com mu nist sys tem, feel com pelled to sup port a leader like Ion Ili escu, even if 
he backs eco nomic ideas that do not al ways cor re spond with the ex pec ta tions of 
the new fi nan cial elite. All these things have al ready hap pened, bring ing Ro ma nia 
closer to the situa tion in Rus sia than to that of other East ern Euro pean coun tries.
The ques tion is if this re val ori za tion of the re cent past, seen from a posi tive per-
spec tive con stantly en hanced, is com pati ble with the proc ess of de moc ra ti za tion. 
Or does this grid of in ter pre ta tion of the re cent past re veal au thori tar ian urges? The 
an swer is quite safely af firma tive, if we are to take into ac count the po liti cal be hav-
ior of the PSD, its will to dis cour age the de vel op ment of the civil so ci ety and the at-
ti tude to wards the par lia men tary op po si tion be tween 2001 and 2004.
The PSD’s re turn to power in De cem ber 2000 caused a halt in the de moc ra ti za-
tion proc ess. The post-com mu nist State seemed in ca pa ble of man ag ing the 
changes and of trans lat ing into po liti cal terms the free dom of the so ci ety, a so ci ety 
that es caped its con trol be cause it did not try to gov ern it, but to in clude it. Nowa-
days the PSD, the Party of So cial De moc racy, is char ac ter ized less by the type of 
con ser va tism that ini tially de fined it, and more by one of its com po nents, the temp-
ta tion of au thori tari an ism, ex plain able by the type of the re la tion ship it de vel oped 
with the State, as if the pol icy of for get ting was only meant to hide the in sti tu tional 
mem ory spe cific to the party-State.
Con clu sions
It seems clear that de moc ratic con soli da tion in Ro ma nia is no longer de pend-
ent on the man ner of look ing at the com mu nist past, but this pa per has re viewed 
the dif fi cul ties that Ro ma nian po liti cal par ties have en coun tered while build ing 
1 Jan-Werner MULLER, ”Introduction: the Power of Memory, the Memory of Power and the 
Power over Memory”, in IDEM (ed.), Memory and Power in Post-war Europe. Studies in the Presence 
of the Past, Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp. 1-38/p. 31. 
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an iden tity in the ab sence of a clear cri te rion, such as a defi nite at ti tude to wards 
the re cent past. If, af ter 1989, the ab sence of de com mu ni za tion was symp to matic 
for the slow pace of de moc ra ti za tion as com pared to other neighbor ing coun tries, 
years later the same re al ity seems re spon si ble for the lack of con soli da tion of the 
de moc ratic proc ess.
The rift cre ated by the vari ous at ti tudes to wards the com mu nist past has not 
been fad ing be cause the prob lem of the com mu nist leg acy is fi nally re solved, but 
rather be cause the main po liti cal ac tors car ry ing the anti-com mu nist mes sage are now 
com pro mised, fol low ing their un suc cess ful ad mini stra tion of be tween 1996-2000.
Ro ma nian plu ral ism, born and con soli dated on the chasm be tween dif fer ent 
at ti tudes on the com mu nist past, suf fers as a re sult of the dif fi cul ties that par ties 
en coun ter in learn ing how to ex press the in ter est of the so ci ety and in de fin ing 
their own doc trine’s iden tity. The po liti cal at ti tudes to wards the past that shaped 
the Ro ma nian po liti cal scene be fore 2000 play a lesser role. But this is the sign of a 
cri sis of Ro ma nian plu ral ism, be cause there are no clear cri te ria based on which to 
dis tin guish be tween po liti cal pro grams. In 2004 elec tions, the civil so ci ety was mo-
bi lized on themes founded on this old rift.
In some kind of anal ogy with the places where monu ments from the pe riod 
of ”so cial ist re al ism” lie side by side with monu ments dedi cated to anti-com mu-
nist fight ers, Ro ma nia is pre par ing to ac cept si mul ta ne ously radi cally dif fer ent vi-
sions of the past, but the ca pac ity to draw les sons from our com mu nist past has 
proven po liti cally lim ited.
